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Austin Roche 
 
KIMBLE V. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC: 
ECONOMIC ARGUMENT DEFEATED; 
SUPERPOWERED STARE DECISIS PREVAILS 
In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC1, the issue presented to the Supreme Court 
was whether it should overrule its decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,2 which held that a 
patentee cannot receive royalty payments after the term of the patent has expired.3 
The Court held that under stare decisis it must uphold the Brulotte ruling.4 The Court 
ruled correctly by upholding a ruling on statutory interpretation that Congress had 
left unchanged for over half a century.5 The dissent’s inaccurate argument that the 
Brulotte ruling was actually bad policymaking is not enough to overcome the 
powerful force of stare decisis.6 
I.  THE CASE 
In 1990, Stephen Kimble invented a Spider-Man toy that allowed its user to spray 
foam string by pulling a trigger, thus imitating Spider-Man’s ability to shoot a 
spider’s web.7 Kimble patented the toy idea under U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856, which 
expired on May 25, 2010.8 Kimble met with a Marvel representative in 1990 to discuss 
his ideas regarding the patent.9 He contends that during this meeting, the 
representative told him that Marvel would compensate him if it used any of his 
 
© 2017 Austin Roche  
   J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2017. 
 1.  135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
 2.  379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 3.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). 
 4.  Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2405. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.   Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kimble v. Marvel 
Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
 8.  Id. at 858 
 9.  Id. 
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ideas.10 Later, Marvel began manufacturing a similar Spider Man toy called the “Web 
Blaster,” which would also allow its users to spray foam string by pulling a trigger.11 
In 1997, Kimble brought suit against Marvel for patent infringement and breach 
of contract, alleging that Marvel broke its verbal agreement with him by not 
compensating him for using the ideas he disclosed at the 1990 meeting.12 The district 
court granted Marvel’s motion for summary judgment on the patent infringement 
claim, and a jury found in favor of Kimble on the contract claim.13The court awarded 
Kimble 3.5% of past, present, and future Web Blaster net product sales in the contract 
case.14 
Kimble and Marvel agreed to settle these cases while the appeals were still pending 
in 2001.15 The terms of the Agreement included that the parties would withdraw their 
appeals, and that Marvel would purchase Kimble’s patent.16 The Purchase Agreement 
stated that: 
The purchase price for the Patent shall be payable to the Patent Holders as 
follows: 
a. $516,214.62 upon execution and delivery of this Agreement; and 
b. 3% of “net product sales” (as such term is used in the Judgment) excluding 
refill royalties made after December 31, 2000. For purposes of this paragraph 
3.b, “net product sales” shall be deemed to include product sales that would 
infringe the Patent but for the purchase and sale thereof pursuant to this 
Agreement as well as sales of the Web Blaster product that was the subject of 
the Action and to which the Judgment refers.17 
There was no expiration date to the Agreement, and there was no limitation to 
Marvel’s obligation to pay the 3% of net product sales.18 
In 2006, after Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro regarding the 
production of Marvel toys, including the Web Blaster, several disputes arose between 
Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments.19 Marvel counterclaimed and 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 858-59. 
 18.  Id. at 859 
 19.  Id. (“A number of disagreements subsequently arose between Marvel and Kimble concerning the royalty 
payments. These disputes revolved around the calculation of royalties for subsequent iterations of the Web Blaster 
that included additional functions (in addition to shooting foam string) or Web Blasters that were packaged with 
other role play items (such as Spider–Man masks).”) 
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sought a declaration that it was no longer obligated to pay Kimble the royalty 
payments under the Settlement Agreement because the Web Blaster never infringed 
on Kimble’s patent.20 The parties filed for summary judgment, and the United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona referred to the Magistrate Judge for a 
recommendation.21 The Magistrate Judge found that under Brulotte v. Thys Co.,22 the 
royalty provision of the Settlement Agreement was unenforceable reasoning that “the 
Settlement Agreement transferred patent rights, and that it was less clear that it 
transferred any non-patent rights.”23  The district court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and ruled that Marvel was not required to pay royalties under the 
Agreement after the patent expired on May 25th, 2010.24  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, although it 
admitted to reluctantly applying the Brulotte ruling, which it called “ 
counterintuitive” and “unconvincing.”25 Regardless, the Court conceded that Brulotte 
is controlling and thus the Court was bound to follow it.26 The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide whether it should overrule Brulotte.27  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC28 is a patent law case in which the Court’s 
opinion relies heavily on the principle of stare decisis to decide whether it should 
overrule another patent law case, Brulotte v. Thys Co. This section will provide 
background on patent law,29 stare decisis,30 and the Court’s ruling in Brulotte.31 
A.  Patent Law 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), a patent holder is given exclusive rights to his or her 
invention.32 The relevant parts of the Patent Act are as follows: 
(a) In general.-- 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 23.  Kimble, 727 F.3d at 859-60. 
 24.  Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 727 F.3d 856 (9th 
Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
 25.  Kimble, 727 F.3d at 857. 
 26.  Id. at 867. 
 27.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015). 
 28.  135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
 29.  See infra part II.A. 
 30.  See infra Part II.B. 
 31.  See infra Part II.C. 
 32.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015). 
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(1) Contents.--Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a 
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States … 
(2) Term.--Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be 
for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the 
United States.33 
The Act allows a patentee to sell the patent or license it for royalty payments.34 
However, this right is subject to a twenty-year term which begins when the patentee 
files the application to obtain the patent.35 Once this patent term expires, the patentee 
no longer has the exclusive right to make and use the article free from restriction.36 
The Supreme Court ruled in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.37 that “an article on 
which the patent has expired,” like an unpatentable article, “is in the public domain 
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”38 Additionally, the Court 
has deemed unenforceable contract provisions that restrict the free use of 
unpatentable articles and articles for which the patent has expired.39 The Court 
reasoned in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.40 that “any attempted reservation or 
continuation in the patentee . . .  after the patent expires, whatever the legal device 
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws” and “would 
deprive . . . the consuming public of the advantage to be derived” from the free use 
of the article.41 
B.  Stare Decisis 
Stare decisis, the principle that the court will stand by its previous decisions, has been 
described by the Supreme Court as “a foundation stone of the rule of law, necessary 
to ensure that legal rules develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion.’”42 “Stare 
 
 33.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2015). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015). 
 36.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.   Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945) (ruling that a manufacturer could not 
agree to refrain from challenging a patent’s validity). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 256; see also, e.g., Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400–01 (1947) 
(ruling that Scott Paper applies to licensees); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668–75 (1969) (refusing to enforce 
a contract requiring a licensee to pay royalties while contesting a patent’s validity). 
 42.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 
U.S. 254 (1986)). 
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decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”43 However, 
stare decisis is not an “inexorable command” or a “mechanical formula,” but rather a 
policy principle.44 The Court has reasoned that it is more important that the law be 
settled than for it to be settled right.45 An argument that the Court ruled incorrectly 
is not sufficient to overcome stare decisis, there must be some additional, special 
justification that the precedent was wrongly decided.46 
When the Court interprets a statute, stare decisis carries a greater force because any 
disagreements with the interpretation can be settled by Congress, which has the 
authority to create a new statute.47 In other words, if the Court has interpreted a 
statute and Congress has not taken subsequent action to change the statute, the Court 
assumes Congress agrees with the interpretation, which bolsters the idea that the 
judicial interpretation was correct. Additionally, “considerations in favor of stare 
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights,” because 
rulings in such cases are relied upon by parties.48 Parties that create contracts in 
reliance on court rulings may have their expectations upended when a court 
overturns those rulings. Conversely, in the area of antitrust law, “the general 
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with 
respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress ‘expected the 
courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law 
tradition.’”49 
For the Court to overrule a precedent, and thus override stare decisis, it needs a 
special justification. One such justification is an argument that the precedent’s 
statutory and doctrinal underpinnings have eroded.50 When a statutory precedent is 
overruled, the primary reason for the Court’s ruling is often the “intervening 
development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further 
action taken by Congress,”51 or because “the later law has rendered the decision 
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.”52 Another justification for 
 
 43.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 
 44.   Id. at 828 (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). 
 45.   Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
 46.   Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014). 
 47.  See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989). 
 48.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
 49.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (citing National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)). 
 50.  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989). 
 51.  Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1989); see also 
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 321–22 (1972)). 
 52.  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. 
of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 497–499 (1973); Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 552 (1963)). 
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overriding stare decisis is that “a precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence 
and consistency in the law . . . because of inherent confusion created by an 
unworkable decision.”53 
Despite these general principles of stare decisis serving as a basic framework, the 
legal doctrine is “essentially indeterminate.”54 The Supreme Court’s characterization 
of stare decisis as a flexible “principle of policy,”55 as well as the numerous 
considerations that constitute the lengthy inquiry, have both served to confound this 
doctrine and inspire “unusually scathing dissents” from Supreme Court Justices.56 
One particular conflict within this doctrine is illustrated by the differences in the 
Court’s description of stare decisis in two particular cases: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc.57 and Payne v. Tennessee.58 In Halliburton, the Court stated that it 
requires “special justification, not just an argument that the precedent was wrongly 
decided.”59 However, the Payne Court stated that “when governing decisions are 
unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has never felt constrained to follow 
precedent.”60  
The confusion lies in whether “bad reasoning” is a “special justification.” It would 
certainly seem that it is not so, because “if the precedent were correct on the merits,” 
meaning the precedent was well reasoned, “the Court would reaffirm it without 
regard to stare decisis.”61 This conflict is caused by the way courts treat stare decisis in 
cases of statutory interpretation differently than other cases. Halliburton was a case 
involving statutory interpretation, thus a “special justification” was necessary.62 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Brulotte  
In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,63 the Court considered whether a hop-picking machine patent 
owner could continue to license his machines for royalty payments after the patents 
on the machine had expired.64 Thys Company, an owner of various hop-picking 
patents, sold machines to several others for a flat sum and issued a license for their 
 
 53.  Id. (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–48 (1977); Swift & Co. v. 
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124–25 (1965)). 
 54.  Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 414 (2010). 
 55.  Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). 
 56.  Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 413-14 (2010). 
 57.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 58.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 59.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (quotations omitted). 
 60.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quotations omitted). See also Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (overruling a precedential case because it was not “well reasoned”). 
 61.  Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 417 (2010). 
 62.  Halliburton, 134 S.Ct. at 2407. 
 63.  379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 64.  Id. at 29-30. 
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use, under which there was “payable a minimum royalty of $500 for each hop-picking 
season or $3.33 1/3 per 200 pounds of dried hops harvested by the machine, 
whichever is greater.”65 Seven patents listed in the license were incorporated into the 
machines, and all expired on or before 1957.66 However, the licenses issued continued 
for terms beyond 1957.67 Thys Company brought suit when the licensees refused to 
make further royalty payments.68 
The Supreme Court ruled that a patent gives exclusive rights to the patentee to 
make, sell, and use the article, but these rights become public property once the term 
has ended.69 The Court relied on the Scott Paper reasoning that allowing a patentee to 
continue his monopoly after the patent term expires runs counter to the purpose of 
patent law and public policy.70 The Court concluded that “a patentee’s use of a royalty 
agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”71 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, declining to overrule 
Brulotte.72 The Court reasoned that the Brulotte ruling had a “superpowered form of 
stare decisis” because it was a statutory interpretation involving property and contract 
rights, and the Court was presented with no special justification for departing from 
this rule. 73 
The Court began by describing how it has decided cases involving the limiting of 
the free use of patented inventions.74 A patent typically expires twenty years from the 
day its application was filed for, and the Court “has carefully guarded that cut-off 
date” by ruling that once an article’s patent expires, it is in the public domain and 
may be freely made and sold.75 The Court explained the Brulotte rule as a continuation 
of this trend; a contract that requires a party to pay royalties after the patent has 
expired extends the patentee’s monopoly on the article beyond the patent period and 
restricts the public domain’s free use of the article.76 The Court stated that the Brulotte 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 30. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 31 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896); Kellogg Co. v. National 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)). 
 70.  Id. (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)). 
 71.  Id. at 32. 
 72.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015). 
 73.  Id. at 2410. 
 74.  Id. at 2407.  
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 2407-08.  
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ruling may prevent some parties from forming the exact deals they desire, but it only 
bars royalties, so parties can find other ways to achieve the same ends.77 
The Court next discussed the role of stare decisis in this case.78 The Court 
characterized the principle as “a foundation stone of the rule of law.”79 The Court 
stated that an argument that the Court made an incorrect decision is not enough to 
persuade it to overturn a settled precedent; there must be a “special justification” over 
and above the belief that the precedent was wrongly decided.80 Additionally, the 
Court continued, stare decisis holds an even greater force in a case like Brulotte when 
the Court interprets a statute, because such a ruling can be corrected by Congress.81 
The Court determined that Brulotte’s precedential force is further strengthened by 
the fact that Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse it for over half a 
century.82 Lastly, the Court stated that Brulotte is a contracts and property case, which 
are two areas of law in which “considerations favoring stare decisis are ‘at their acme’” 
because parties are likely to rely on rulings in these areas of law.83 The parties 
disagreed whether Brulotte created any reliance (as there was no evidence presented 
of any such licenses existing), but the Court ruled that “even uncertainty on this score 
cuts in Marvel’s direction,” since there was “a reasonable possibility that parties have 
structured their business transactions in light of Brulotte.”84 
Once this high standard of stare decisis is established, the Court states that there 
does not exist a “superspecial justification” to warrant overruling Brulotte.85 First, the 
statutory and doctrinal underpinnings of Brulotte have not eroded over time.86 Scott 
Paper, the case on which Brulotte relied, is still good law.87 Reversing Brulotte may 
threaten other decisions, because of the decision’s “close relation to a whole web of 
precedents,” and the Court would not like to “unsettle stable law.”88 Next, the Court 
claims that Brulotte has not proved to be an unworkable case.89 The current rule is 
easy to apply; the Court must only ask whether a licensing agreement provides 
royalties after the patent has expired.90 This stands in contrast to the alternative rule 
 
 77.  Id. at 2408. 
 78.  Id. at 2409. 
 79.  Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014)). 
 80.  Id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2047 (2014)). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 2409-10. 
 83.  Id. at 2410 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id.at 2411. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–173,(1989) (identifying unworkability 
as another “traditional justification” for overruling precedent)). 
 90.  Id. 
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that Kimble proposes in order to invalidate agreements that have anti-competitive 
consequences: antitrust law’s rule of reason.91 This rule of reason is an “elaborate 
inquiry” that “produces notoriously high litigation costs and unpredictable results.”92 
Thus, Kimble’s proposed alternative would make the rule less workable, not more.93 
The Court also addresses two more of Kimble’s justifications for overruling 
Brulotte.94 Kimble first claims that Brulotte assumed that post-patent royalty 
agreements are invariably anticompetitive, a mistaken view of the effects of such 
arrangements.95 Kimble notes that these agreements more often increase competition 
rather than inhibit it, and the Court does not see an error in this analysis.96 However, 
the Court has two inquires on this claim: was Brulotte actually founded on this 
analysis of competitive effects, and if so is this economic mistake suffice to overcome 
Brulotte?97 The Court said that instead of on a competitive effects analysis, Brulotte 
was actually founded on a bright-line rule that all patents and their benefits must end 
when the patent expires.98 Regardless, the Court stated that even if Brulotte were based 
on that economic mistake, that reason would not be enough to overcome stare decisis 
in this case because Congress is the correct entity to fix that misjudgment, and Kimble 
has not brought forth any changes in economic theory or new empirical studies that 
have changed since the Brulotte rule.99  
Kimble’s second claim is that the Brulotte rule damages the American economy by 
discouraging technological innovation.100 Kimble argued that if parties are not free to 
contract as they please, they may not reach an agreement at all, which may discourage 
invention in the first place.101 The Court rejected this claim because Kimble offers no 
empirical evidence that the Brulotte ruling has led to decreased innovation, and 
because claims that a statutory precedent stifles innovation are more appropriate for 
Congress.102 
In Justice Alito’s dissent, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined, 
he contended that Brulotte was based on a debunked economic theory, and that 
“[s]tare decisis does not require [the Court] to retain this baseless and damaging 
precedent.”103 The dissent claims that Brulotte was not actually about statutory 
 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 2412 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 2413. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 2414. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 2415 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
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interpretation at all because the Patent Act says nothing about post-expiration 
royalties.104 Justice Alito asserts that “nothing in the text of the Act even arguably 
forbids licensing agreements that provide for post-expiration royalties.”105 The 
Brulotte ruling was based on policymaking, and bad policymaking at that, according 
to Justice Alito.106 He states that the economic reasoning of Brulotte has been “soundly 
refuted”; it incorrectly assumes that post-expiration royalties extend the monopoly 
of the patent, but once the patent ends the ability to exclude is gone.107 The majority 
claims that parties can find ways around Brulotte, but Alito claims the need to do this 
is an economic inefficiency.108 Additionally, the majority claims that Brulotte creates 
problems by upsetting parties’ expectations, because often both parties are unaware 
of the rule.109 Marvel’s claim that the Brulotte ruling has generated reliance is not 
supported, but the Court admits there is an uncertainty and gives Marvel the benefit 
of the doubt.110 The dissent asserts that there is no uncertainty, and that what is known 
for sure is that the Brulotte rule has often disrupted parties’ agreements.111 
After breaking down the Brulotte ruling, and even stating that its “only virtue is 
that [the Court] decided it,” the dissent claims that stare decisis does not prevent the 
case from being overruled.112 Justice Alito points to Pearson v. Callahan,113 which states 
that “[r]evisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where … a departure would 
not upset expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule ..., and experience 
has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”114 The dissent contends that stare 
decisis does not require the Court to uphold Brulotte because its holding “had no basis 
in the law,” “[i]ts reasoning has been thoroughly disproved,” “[i]t poses economic 
barriers that stifle innovation,” and “it unsettles contractual expectations.”115 The 
dissent believes that the Court may be more reluctant to overturn decisions 
interpreting statutes, but the Brulotte ruling did not actually interpret a statute.116 
Lastly, the dissent claims the Court places too much weight in the fact that Congress 
did not act to fix the Brulotte rule, citing the reasoning of Girouard v. United States117 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at  2416. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 2417. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 114.  Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2417 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Pearson, supra, note 113, at 233). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 2418. 
 117.  328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
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that “[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of 
a controlling rule of law.”118 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, the United States Supreme Court declined 
to overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co.119 The Court decided correctly by leaving the Brulotte 
rule for Congress to fix, since it was a case of statutory interpretation, not 
policymaking, and a case of patent law, not antitrust law.120 This ruling is not likely to 
create a significant economic impact, but it may lead to Congressional action to 
amend the Patent Act.121 
A.  The Court Decided Kimble Correctly by Giving Stare Decisis Proper Deference 
Kimble was decided correctly, and the dissenting arguments lack merit. The crux of 
the argument in Justice Alito’s dissent is that the Brulotte rule “was not based on 
anything that can plausibly be regarded as an interpretation of the terms of the Patent 
Act,” but rather was based on a now debunked economic theory.122 The dissent even 
continues to say that “nothing in the text of the Act even arguably forbids licensing 
agreements that provide for post-expiration royalties.”123 Based on the text of both 
the Brulotte opinion and the Patent Act, both of these claims are false. 
The Patent Act gives a patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the patented article, and these rights are only granted during the twenty year 
term.124 The Act does not explicitly forbid licensing agreements with post-expiration 
royalties, but this consequence can be reasonably inferred. Such an agreement is a 
way for a patentee to sell his exclusive rights to make, use or sell the article. When the 
term ends, the patentee no longer has these exclusive rights because they pass to the 
public. Thus, it can reasonably be concluded that a patentee should not be able to sell 
rights that are no longer exclusive to him. 
The dissent incorrectly believes that the Brulotte ruling was not an interpretation 
of the Patent Act, but rather based on an economic theory.125 Justice Alito 
characterizes Brulotte as “an antitrust decision masquerading as a patent case.”126 He 
argues that the decision was “principally concerned with patentees improperly 
 
 118.  Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing  Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70 
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leveraging their monopoly power,” and that it “expressly characterized post-
expiration royalties as anti-competitive tying arrangements.”127 While the Brulotte 
ruling does indeed state these economic arguments, they are merely used in support 
of the statutory interpretation reasoning.  
Brulotte was in fact a ruling of statutory interpretation based on its discussion of 
the text of the Patent Act and its reliance on the Scott Paper decision.128 After 
examining the text of the Patent Act, the Brulotte Court stated that the patent rights 
“become public property” once the term is over by relying on the text from the Scott 
Paper decision which stated “any attempted reservation or continuation in the 
patentee … after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter 
to the policy and purpose of the patent laws.”129 This quote from Scott Paper is a clear 
statutory interpretation because it relies on the “policy and purpose” of the Patent 
Act. Furthermore, since the Brulotte ruling relied on Scott Paper, it is clear that 
Brulotte was also a statutory interpretation. As the majority opinion in Kimble puts 
it, “Brulotte did not undertake to assess that practice’s likely competitive effects. 
Instead, it applied a categorical principle that all patents, and all benefits from them, 
must end when their terms expire.”130 To say that Brulotte was merely “masquerading 
as a patent case” is an incredibly unfair characterization based on these arguments.131  
Perhaps the most damning evidence to the dissent’s argument is found in a 
footnote to Justice Harlan’s Brulotte dissent: “it should not be overlooked that we are 
dealing here with a patent, not an antitrust case.”132 Even the dissent in Brulotte was 
firmly aware that the case was certainly a patent one. It is important to note that the 
majority opinion is aware of how pivotal this characterization is; Justice Kagan writes 
that “[i]f Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case,” the Court might rule 
in Kimble’s favor.133 
The dissent’s subsequent arguments are rendered moot by the fact that Brulotte 
was ruled on statutory interpretation. After making his assertion that Brulotte is based 
on policymaking, Justice Alito goes on in his dissent to explain why such a policy is a 
bad one and thus should be overturned.134 This argument is of no significance because 
as Justice Kagan stated in the majority opinion, “the choice of what patent policy 
should be lies first and foremost with Congress.”135 The dissent continues to state that 
“we do not give super-duper protection to decisions that do not actually interpret a 
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statute.”136 This argument is clearly moot in light of the fact that Brulotte was a 
statutory interpretation, thus the “enhanced force” of stare decisis argued by the 
majority still stands.137 
B.  The Kimble Ruling Will Not Have a Significant Economic Impact  
The ruling here is not likely to have any significant economic impact; however, it may 
eventually have an impact on patent law. The first effect is clear: a patentee may not 
enforce a royalty provision in a licensing agreement once his patent has expired. This 
ruling may prevent some parties from entering into the exact deals they require, but 
as the majority opinion states, “parties can often find ways around Brulotte.”138 For 
example, an agreement where a licensee defers payments for the use of a patent 
during the patent period into the post-expiration period of the patent are still 
allowed.139 Additionally, a post-expiration royalty is still allowed if it is tied to a non-
patent right.140 This means two parties can enter an agreement where a royalty for a 
patent is paid during the patent period, and during the post patent period a royalty 
is paid for a trade secret.141 The decision is also unlikely to upset any expectations of 
parties who entered into post-patent royalty agreements, because Marvel was unable 
to present any such examples and Kimble claimed no “meaningful number of [such] 
license agreements ... actually exist.”142 While the Court did admit ignorance as to 
whether such agreements exist, it seems unlikely that if neither side was able to find 
any examples that this decision would create significant problems for existing 
agreements.143  
However, as Kimble contends and the Court does not refute, “a broad scholarly 
consensus supports Kimble’s view of the [positive] competitive effects of post-
expiration royalties.”144 While Kimble’s economic argument may not have had any 
effect on the Court, it is plausible that this case will bring the attention of Congress 
to this issue. After all, the Court explicitly stated that “[c]ritics of the Brulotte rule 
must seek relief not from this Court but from Congress.”145 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC146, the issue presented to the Court was 
whether it should overrule its decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.147, which held that a 
patentee cannot receive royalty payments after the term of the patent has expired.148 
The court held that under stare decisis it must uphold the Brulotte ruling.149 The Court 
ruled correctly by upholding a ruling on statutory interpretation that had been 
unchanged by Congress for over half a century. The dissent’s inaccurate argument 
that the Brulotte ruling was actually bad policymaking is not enough to overcome 
stare decisis. 
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